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GENTLY MODIFIED OPERATIONS: How
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS ADDRESSED THROUGH
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES CAN SUCCESSFULLY
RESOLVE THE US-EU GMO DISPUTE
DAVID E. SELLA-VILLA*
INTRODUCTION
Genetically modified organisms ("GMOs") inspire heated policy
competition among countries.' At the heart of the GMO dispute is a funda-
mental difference in belief about the impact of GMOs on the economy, the
environment, and human health.2 The GMO exporting world, lead by the
United States, encourages and facilitates easy GMO entry into the econ-
omy and the food supply. The U.S. sufficiently trusts the science suggest-
ing a limited negative impact of GMOs.3 The European Union ("EU"),
influenced by the precautionary principle that new technology should not
be adopted until it can be proven safe,4 desires definitive scientific proof
* J.D. candidate 2009, William & Mary School of Law. M.Sc. European Political Economy:
Integration, London School of Economics, 2006. B.S. Economics & B.A. International
Studies, West Virginia University, 2005. I would like to thank my wife, Genevieve
Okuma, for her support and comments as this Note took form. I would also like to thank
everyone who edited this piece for their excellent work. All mistakes and errors are solely
my responsibility.
1 Mystery Bridgers, Comment and Note, Genetically Modified Organisms and the
Precautionary Principle: How the GMO Dispute before the World Trade Organization
Could Decide the Fate of International GMO Regulation, 22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
171, 171 (2004).
2 Layla Zurek, Comment, The European Communities Biotech Dispute: How the WTO
Fails to Consider Cultural Factors in the Genetically Modified Food Debate, 42 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 345, 350-51 (2007); see also Aaron A. Ostrovsky, The European Commission's Regu-
lations of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Current WTO Dispute-Human Health
or Environmental Measures? Why the Deliberate Release Directive is More Appropriately
Adjudicated in the WTO under the TBTAgreement, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
209,214-16 (2004); Cinnamon Carlarne, From the USA with Love: Sharing Home-Grown
Hormones, GMOs, and Clones with a Reluctant Europe, 37 ENVTL. L. 301,302-03 (2007).
3 Carlarne, supra note 2, at 309; Joseph Murphy et al., Regulatory Standards for
Environmental Risks: Understanding the US-European Union Conflict over Genetically
Modified Crops, 36 Soc. STUD. OF SCI. 1, 133, 133 (2006).
" Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000) 8
final (Feb. 2, 2000); UNITED NATIONS UNIvERsITY-INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
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that GMOs will not irreparably damage the environment or human
health.5 The World Trade Organization ("WTO") lends support to the
United States' understanding on the matter. The United Nations under
the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity tends to support a more EU-styled
approach to GMO proliferation.6
The US and EU perspectives on GMOs clashed at the WTO in
2003. 7 In 1998, the EU commenced a de facto moratorium on allowing
GMOs to enter the European food supply. Though a GMO approval re-
gime was in place, no new GMOs gained the requisite permission for im-
portation between 1998 and 2003. GMO exporting countries, the United
States, Canada, and Argentina, challenged the EU moratorium under the
WTO agreements. The case is known as EC-Biotech. The WTO Dispute
Settlement Unit ("DSU") constituted a panel in 2003 and issued its final
panel report in 2006.8 The DSU found the EU in violation of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement ("SPS Agreement").9 The EU was
given until June 2008 to make changes to its GMO regime in accordance
with the WTO DSU recommendation. 10
The US and EU domestic GMO regulatory systems reflect the dif-
ferences displayed at the international level. The United States allows
the Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), the Environmental Protection
[UN-UIAS] REPORT, TRADING PRECAUTION: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE
WTO 3 (2005), available at http'//www.ias.unu.edu/binaries2/Precautionary%20Principle
%20and%20WTO.pdf; see Bridgers, supra note 1; see also Theofanis Christoforou, The
Precautionary Principle and Democratizing Expertise: A European Legal Perspective, 30
SCI. AND PUB. POL. 205, 206 (2003) (noting that the precautionary principle emerges as
a policy response from the confluence of uncertainty, risk, and the lack of a direct causal
link between them).
'Thomas P. Redick, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Precautionary Priority in Biotech
Crop Approvals and Containment of Commodities Shipments, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POLY 51, 77-84 (2007).
6Anais Kedgley Laidlaw, Is It Better to Be Safe Than Sorry? The Cartagena Protocol Versus
the World Trade Organization, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 427, 429 (2005).
7 Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing
of Biotech Product (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu~e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm (click the "Panel Report" hyperlink and download the report
dated 29/09/2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotech].
8 Id. at2.
9 As of this date, the WTO has not published any document indicating that the EU has
brought its GMO regime into compliance or explaining what steps the EU is taking to
bring its GMO regime into compliance. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement:
Dispute DS291, httpJ/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/casese/ds291_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009).
18 Id.
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Agency ("EPA"), and the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to ap-
prove GMOs with only limited impact testing on humans and the environ-
ment." Only the party seeking approval needs to conduct such testing.12
In Europe, the handful of approved GMOs have had to pass rigorous im-
pact tests conducted by both the party seeking approval and independent
scientists within the EU's GMO approval bureaucracy. 3
The differences in the legal regimes reflect and inspire different
social and cultural approaches to GMOs. In the United States, consumers
tend to trust the USDA, EPA, and FDA approval processes. 4 Few con-
sumers take an active curiosity in the GMO content of their foods and
the potential environmental and health impacts of GMOs. 15 European
consumers, unlike Americans, express deep skepticism about the envi-
ronmental impact of GMOs. 6 Many Europeans resist the competition
between GMO and non-GMO foods because of the cultural impact on
societies that actively seek to protect an indigenous agrarian element. 7
Also, since the Mad Cow scare of the mid-1990s, Europeans have tended
not to trust their governments' food safety regulations. 8
As the EU addresses the WTO's recommendations, the process
exposes the tensions between the two competing views on GMOs at each
level. Any change to the EU regime must negotiate between the United
States' view embodied in the WTO decision and the already established
EU view with its legal and cultural trappings. In recent years, the EU
"' Bridgers, supra note 1, at 175-80; Zurek, supra note 2, at 350-52.
12 Zurek, supra note 2, at 350-52; see also 7 C.F.R. §§ 340.0-340.9 (2001); Coordinated
Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986).
13 See generally Commission Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 043) (EC); Council Directive
2001/18, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (EC); see infra Part II.B.
14 Zurek, supra note 2, at 350-51; see Thomas 0. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal
Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 430-31 (2002).
" John Stephen Fredland, Note, Unlabel Their Frankenstein Foods!: Evaluating a U.S.
Challenge to the European Commission's LabelingRequirements for Food Products Contain-
ing Genetically-Modified Organisms, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 183, 187-88 (2000); see
also Nigel Williams,Agriculture Biotech Faces Backlash in Europe, 281 SCIENCE 768,768
(Aug. 7, 1998).
16 Fredland, supra note 15, at 187-92 (citing newspaper articles which reveal profound
unease among Europeans regarding GMOs).
7 Zurek, supra note 2, at 360-61 (citing Michael R. Dove, The Agronomy of Memory and
the Memory of Agronomy: Ritual Conservation of Archaic Cultigens in Contemporary
Farming Systems 45, 45-66 in ETHNOECOLOGY: SITUATED KNOWLEDGE/LOCATED LIVES
(Virginia D. Nazarea ed., 1999)).
18 Id. at 358. See generally Damian Chalmers, Risk, Anxiety and the Mediation of the
Politics of Life: The European Food Safety Authority and the Government of Biotechnology,
30 EuR. L. REV. 649 (2005).
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has approved some new GMOs to enter the European food supply. 19 This
indicates that the EU can change GMO regulations," and may already
have changed its legal regime to reflect a more WTO oriented approach
to GMO approval.2
A GMO's approval, however, represents only one element of the
process of GMOs arriving on the EU market. Ultimately, consumers will
choose whether to buy products containing GMOs.22 Part of that decision
will be based on the information the EU requires that sellers provide to
consumers.2 3 Before GMOs even enter the economy, though, their ship-
ments must clear customs.
The EU has limited control over the customs procedures in eachMember State.2 4 While the EU sets common tariffs and customs policy,
Member States design their own implementation procedures.25 Accord-
ingly, each Member State can exert some control over how goods clear cus-
toms at each of their ports and borders,26 including GMOs. For example,
EU legislation mandates consistent classification of GMOs for the pur-
pose of collecting duties, but each Member State can enforce customs rules
which require extensive warehousing delays, designate certain goods as
dangerous to the environment, limit the permissible areas where danger-
ous goods can travel, and delay the resolution of disputes with lengthy
administrative and judicial proceedings.2
The GMO dispute before the WTO can only recommend changes
in the EU level GMO approval regime.2" As long as the EU constituencies
9 EC-Biotech, supra note 7, at 64-75.
20 See Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1 (EC); Council Regulation
1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24 (EC); Brian Schwartz, WTO and GMOs: Analyzing the
European Community's Recent Regulations Covering the Labeling of Genetically Modified
Organisms, 25 MICH. J. INTL L. 771, 781 (2004).
21 See Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20; Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20. cf
Redick, supra note 5 (arguing that the EU's traceability and labeling scheme still violates
the WTO agreements).
22 Zurek, supra note 2, at 361-68. See generally DAviD TOKE, THE POLITICS OF GM FOOD:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UKM US AND EU (Routledge, London 2004).
23 Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20; Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20.
24 BEN J.M. TERRA, COMMUNITY CUSTOMS LAW, A GUIDE TO THE CUSTOMS RULES ON
TRADE BETWEEN THE (ENLARGED) EU AND THIRD COUNTRIES 3 (1995).25 Council Regulation 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. 1,
arts. 1, 38, 44, 64, 183, 250 (L 302) (EC).
26 See MICHAEL LUx, GUIDE TO COMMUNITY CUSTOMS LEGISLATION 32-38 (2002).
21 Id.; see Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 252; TERRA, supra note 24;
Redick, supra note 5.
' Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
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still perceive the risk posed by GMOs, governments will attempt to de-
velop policies which try to mitigate those risks.2 9 As demonstrated, the
EU GMO approval regime only constitutes one part of the system which
brings GMOs to EU markets."° Even if the EU brings its GMO approval
regime within WTO standards, Member States may use their powers
within the EU customs regime to restrict the entry of GMOs into domes-
tic markets.
This Note will assess the ability of the WTO decision to allow for
the easy and successful importation and entry of GMOs into the EU mar-
ket while addressing the EU's environmental concerns. Part I will outline
the environmental threats posed by GMOs. Part II will explain the inter-
national agreements affecting trade of GMOs, the EU GMO regulatory
regime, and the competencies of the EU Member States regarding GMOs.
Part III will outline the international customs system, explain the EU
level customs system, and highlight Member States' powers within the
EU customs system. Part IV will summarize the EC-Biotech case before
the WTO and trace its impact on the GMOs importation and customs re-
gimes in the EU.
Part V will explore possible legal solutions which both allow for the
easy and successful importation of GMOs into the EU and address the
EU constituencies' environmental concerns. Each proposed solution will
also take into account the institutional and political realities of the EU,
thereby serving as a gauge for the likelihood of the adoption of each such
solution. The final part will summarize and conclude.
I. GMOs AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Farmers and plant scientists have been combining plants to
achieve specific genetic and physical traits for several thousands of
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1227, art. 19(1) (1994) (limiting
Panel and Appellate recommendations on conformity to the measure under review) [herein-
aftr DSU]; MITsuo MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, & PETRos C. MAvORIDIs, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 80-81 (Oxford 2003) (noting that
the WTO panels only make recommendations, partially because panelists consider the
political concerns inherent in policy change and "generally disfavor remedies that might
'rock the boat"); see also Charles W. Smitherman III, Comment, World Trade Organization
Adjudication of the European Union-United States Dispute Over the Moratorium on the
Introduction of New Genetically Modified Foods to the European Common Market: A
Hypothetical Opinion of the Dispute Panel, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 475, 502 (2002).
29 See Chalmers, supra note 18.
30 See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
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years.3 The modern version of plant science has been genetically modify-
ing plants directly by adding artificial sections of genetic code to existing
plants in order to give the plants characteristics they would not other-
wise have.32 One example of this is golden rice, where genetic modification
allows the rice to retain antioxidants in order to increase its nutritional
value.33 Other GMOs are pesticide and herbicide resistant.34 Others be-
come resistant to natural predators.
Evidence suggests, though, that GMOs with these traits can have
significant environmental impacts. On a genetic level, GMOs can transfer
their genes to other non-GMO plants, undermining their genetic integ-
rity.36 The natural plants, therefore, adopt the artificial modifications
and cease to exist in their natural form.37 This may produce more homoge-
nous hybrid plants across a species which reduce the diversity within the
species.3 8
GMOs also affect biodiversity in other ways. GMOs are more re-
silient than the unadulterated varietals of the species. The GMOs, or
plants which have received the GMO material, could completely replace
the natural species, which reduces biodiversity. 39 Also, this resilience
means that the plant's natural predators cannot keep the population in
its proper balance.' Weediness, on a large scale, means that GMO plants
could overrun other plants in the ecosystem.41
The environmental effects of GMOs, therefore, can be catastrophic.
Humans have been changing ecosystems through the import of non-native
31 Colorado State University, History of Plant Breeding, http://www.cls.casa.colostate
.edufTransgenicCrops/history.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
32 Colorado State University, What are Transgenic Plants, http://www.cls.casa.colostate
.edu/TransgenicCrops/what.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
' Golden Rice Project, Quantum leap: Golden Rice Accumulates Provitamin A
(/&carotene) in the Grain, http://www.goldenrice.org/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
' See Paul Brown, GM Crops Created Superweed, Say Scientists: Modified Rape Crosses
with Wild Plant to Create Tough Pesticide-Resistant Strain, THE GUARDIAN, July, 25, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2005/ul/25/gm.food.
35 Alicia Burns, Europe: The Debate Over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), http://
unix.dfn.orgprinterGMO.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).36 See generally NEAL STEwART, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PLANET: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS (2004).
37 id.
3 id.
39 Id.
40 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS:
FRAMEWORKFOR DECISIONS 37-53 (1989), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php
?recordjid= 1431&page=37.
41 Id.
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species into ecosystems, such as the famous case of the fox in Australia.42
GMOs are designed to exist in a manner immune to the consequences of
the ecosystem. Human involvement in such activities bothers some people
and policy makers alike.' Ecosystems evolve, but some feel humans should
not play such a direct role in the process.
II. LEGAL REGIMES AFFECTING GMO TRADE
As GMOs have emerged, countries and stakeholders have used es-
tablished governmental organizations to try and regulate GMOs at levels
proportionate to the risks perceived by their constituencies. This section
summarizes GMO regulatory regimes at the international and EU levels.
A. International Agreements
1. The WTO Agreements
The WTO is an international organization that "deal [s] with the
rules of trade between nations."' Countries of the former General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade established the WTO in 1995 and agreed to
conduct trade in accordance with the WTO agreements.45 Distinct from
other international organizations, the WTO has a dispute settlement mech-
anism through which Member States can enforce the WTO agreements
against each other.46
The agreement establishing the WTO outlines the structure of the
WTO and includes the rules for the Dispute Settlement Unit and Trade
Policy Reviews.47 The rules governing trade are divided into three basic
agreements covering different trade issues: the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") for goods,4" the General Agreement on Trade
in Services ("GATS") for services, and the Trade-Related Aspects of
42 Animals Australia, Introduced Animals Fact Sheet, http://www.animalsaustralia.org/
factsheets/introducedwildanimals.php (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
Zurek, supra note 2, at 350-51.
World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatise/whatise.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
4 5 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 17 (Gen6ve, 2007), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatise/tife/utwchap le.pdf.
4Id. at 9.47 Id. at 24.
4 The name of the agreement on trade in goods is the same as the name of the prede-
cessor organization to the WTO. The GATT, in fact, only successfully dealt with goods.
See id. at 19.
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Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") for intellectual property.49 Each
of these basic agreements, except TRIPS, has sub-agreements that deal
with specific sectors and specialized trade issues.5"
Agreements under the GATT apply most directly to the trade of
GMOs. The relevant sub-agreements are the Agriculture Agreement,5
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreements ("SPS"),"2 and the
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement ("TBT").53 Each of these agree-
ments impacts how governments regulate, produce, classify, transport,
and market GMOs. These agreements strive to make trade more market
oriented, to establish internationally accepted norms, and to simplify ex-
isting regulatory structures.' In short, the WTO agreements do not want
to eliminate regulation of GMOs, but want regulations applying to GMOs
to be as trade-friendly as possible.
2. United Nations Agreements
In 1992 members of the United Nations created the Convention
on Biological Diversity, known as the Rio Convention.55 The Rio Convention
sought to orient world leaders around the notion of sustainable develop-
ment.56 Specific to GMO regulation, Article 19.3 of the Rio Convention
allowed countries to establish protocols for dealing with "the safe transfer,
handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from biotech-
nology that my have an adverse effect on ... biological diversity."57
In 2000, member countries of the Rio Convention established such
a protocol for the transport of living genetically modified organisms-the
Cartagena Protocol.5" Driven strongly by the EU, "the [Cartagena] Protocol's
49 Id. at 23-24.
50 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 45, at 23-24.51 Id. at 27-29.
52 Id. at 30.
5Id. at 30-31.
54Id. at 27-30.
" Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth, http://www.cbd.int/
convention/guide.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
'Id. The Convention defines sustainable development as"meeting [today's] needs while
ensuring that we leave a healthy and viable world for future generations." Id.
57 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIvERSITY, June 5, 1992, S. Treaty Doc.
20 art. 19.3 (1993), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818, available at httpJ/www.cbd.int/convention/
convention.shtml.
58 CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
Jan. 29, 2000, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1027, available
at httpJ/www.cbd.int/biosafety/protocol.shtml.
978 [Vol. 33:971
GENTLY MODIFIED OPERATIONS
main concern is restricting the movement of GMO's in accordance with
the precautionary principle.""s The Cartagena Protocol, however, covers
only those GMOs "that will be intentionally introduced into the environ-
ment, such as seeds, live fish, and genetically modified microorganisms
used for bioremediation purposes."6° Whether this list should be read to
include food stuffs meant for human consumption is heavily debated.6'
3. Interaction between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol
The intended purposes of the WTO agreements and Cartagena
Protocol appear to be in conflict." The WTO agreements seek to liberate
GMOs from trade-restrictive regulatory schemes while the Cartagena
Protocol limits trade in GMOs to only those products proven safe within
the high standard of the precautionary principle. 3 However, a careful
examination of the two systems reveals that there is in fact little conflict
between them. The text of the agreements, the scope of the agreements,
and their differences in enforceability keep the realms ofWTO agreements
and the Cartagena Protocol separate.
The Cartagena Protocol does not aim to conflict with the WTO
agreements." In its Preamble, the Cartagena Protocol attempts to coexist
on an equal plane with the WTO agreements, namely:
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements
should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving
sustainable development,
5 Laidlaw, supra note 6, at 429. Laidlaw points out that the Cartagena Protocol's bent
toward the precautionary principle is actually rooted in the Rio Convention's article 15.
Id. at 430; see UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 57,
at art. 15.
0 Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the Environment: The
Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and SPS Agreement of the World
Trade Organization, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (2003) (citations omitted).
611d. at 8-9; Darren Smits & Sean Zaboroski, Trade and Genetically Modified Foods: GMOs:
Chumps or Champs of International Trade?, 1 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 111, 124-
26 (2001) (characterizing the Cartagena Protocol as "an attempt to balance trade concerns
with the environmental and health concerns of five conflicting groups.").
62 Laidlaw, supra note 6, at 429.
6 See supra notes 54 & 59 and accompanying text.
64 CRAIG THORN & KEVIN BROSCH, THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOsAFETY AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING AWTO-CONSISTENT BIOSAFETYREGUILATORY
FRAMEWORK 4-5 (Nov. 2004), available at http://dtbassociates.com/sitebuildercontent/
sitebuilderfiles/cartagenavswto.pdf.
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Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as
implying a change in the rights and obligations of a Party
under any existing international agreements,
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to
subordinate this Protocol to other international agree-
ments, .. 65
From this language, it is clear that the Cartagena Protocol was not
designed to compete with, undermine, or fall subordinate to the WTO
agreements. Thorn and Brosch make a convincing point of this by exam-
ining each provision which could conflict with the WTO agreements, and
finding that none do in fact conflict.66
The WTO agreements and the Cartagena Protocol tend to cover
different goods. The Cartagena Protocol applies only to living modified
organisms.6 7 While the WTO's Agriculture Agreement takes steps to liber-
alize trade in agriculture-including live products, trade in the field
tends to remain highly distorted.6" The Agriculture Agreement does little
to actually facilitate free trade in agricultural products because its terms
only become enforceable after a country decides to open its agricultural
market to trade and then resorts to protectionism.69 As long as countries
retain their current trade regimes concerning agricultural products, the
Agriculture Agreement fails to help facilitate trade.7" Accordingly, it is
likely that WTO agreements cannot be enforced against provisions which
apply to the living organisms regulated by the Cartagena Protocol.71
65 CARTAGENA PROTOCOL, supra note 58, at Pmbl.
66 THORN & BROSCH, supra note 64, at 6-13.
67 CARTAGENA PROTOCOL, supra note 58, and accompanying text (emphasis added).
" See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: the WTO Agreement on Agri-
culture, Food Security and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 433,459-68
(2002); see also World Trade Organization, Agriculture: Fairer Markets for Farmers, http'/
www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3-e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
69 Such an action would be considered a breach of the WTO agreements because a party
would have rights and then they would be nullified or impaired. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. 23 [hereinafter GATT].
70 Only twenty-six of the over three hundred and seventy cases before the DSB have in-
volved agricultural products. Of those cases, only a handful resulted in panel or appellate
decisions which turned on the Agriculture Agreement. World Trade Organization, Find
dispute cases, http://www.wto.org/englisldtratop-e/dispu-e/find dispu-casese.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009) (using "agricultural products" as the search term to find the list of
twenty-six); see also Gonzalez, supra note 68, at 484-89.
71 In fact, none of the Complaining Parties in the EC-Biotech dispute could convince the
Dispute Panel that the EU had violated any provision of the Agriculture Agreements. See
EC-Biotech, WT/DS291IR (Sept. 26, 2006).
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Where WTO provisions do apply to GMOs, the Cartagena Protocol
is not likely to be relevant. As indicated, the Agriculture Agreement is not
likely to apply to live modified organisms. When GMOs are processed,
though, they are more likely to be characterized as goods. If traded as
goods, the GATT applies, exclusive of the Cartagena Protocol.72
Regarding enforceability, the WTO agreements and the Cartagena
Protocol do not conflict. The WTO has a dispute settlement mechanism
designed to handle disputes grounded in the WTO agreements.73 The
Cartagena Protocol, like most UN Conventions, has no dispute adjudica-
tion or enforcement mechanism.74 Where both international agreements
may apply, only the WTO will be able to adjudicate the matter. The WTO
may consider other international agreements in its adjudication, but only
within the scope of the dispute before it. 75 This means that only interpre-
tations of the Cartagena Protocol which are in accordance with the WTO
agreements can actually be enforced.76
The WTO Dispute Settlement Unit, however, prefers to read the
WTO agreements in the context of public international law.77 The WTO
uses the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to interpret the appli-
cable law of covered agreements.78 Article 30 of the Vienna Convention
insists that if "a treaty.., is subject to... an earlier or later treaty, the
provisions of that other treaty prevail."79 The Cartagena Protocol does
not explicitly mention the WTO agreements, but it does mention trade
agreements generally.8 ° Per the Vienna Convention, neither treaty should
prevail. If neither treaty prevails, then it cannot be said that the inter-
national agreements conflict.
When WTO members in dispute are also parties to the Cartagena
Protocol, the WTO tends to try to interpret the WTO agreements in
72 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
73 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 45, at 9.
74 See Leo Gross, Problems of International Adjudication and Compliance with Inter-
national Law: Some Simple Solutions, 59 AM. J. INT'LL. 48,51 (1965) (discussing the extent
of non-compliance pervasive throughout the United Nations decision making organs).75 See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 23-25.76 See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 60.77 THORN & BROSCH, supra note 64, at 5 (citing Appellate Body Report, United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 17 WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29,1996)).
78 World Trade Organization, Subject Index: Interpretation of Covered Agreements, Appli-
cable Law, httpJ/www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookspe/analytic-index_e/index.ie.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2009).
79 THORN & BROSCH, supra note 64, at 5 (citing VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969)).
80 CARTAGENA PROTOCOL, supra note 58, at Pmbl.
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accordance with the Cartagena Protocol.8' If either of the parties in the
WTO dispute is not a party to the Cartagena Protocol, then the WTO
dispute settlement unit does not interpret the WTO agreements in light
of the Cartagena Protocol.82 Accordingly, at no point during the enforce-
ment of WTO agreements do the agreements conflict with the joint
obligations of the parties to the Cartagena Protocol.83
In summary, the WTO agreements and the Cartagena Protocol,
though based on different principles, do not conflict in their application.
The text of the agreements, the scope of the agreements, and interpretive
mechanisms used in WTO agreement enforcement tends toward the har-
monious coexistence and/or the correct application of the relevant treaty
or treaties when necessary.
B. EU Level GMO Regulatory Regime
The EU, since its earliest incarnation as the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1950, has pursued the integration of the economies of
its Member States.8' To facilitate trade among Member States, European
leaders designed a system of laws, regulations, and rules rooted most re-
cently in the principle of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition requires
that if a good meets the regulatory standards set in one Member State,
then another Member State must accept it as safe and not restrict its sale
more than it would a similar good produced domestically.85 Where Member
States have more pressing concerns about specific goods and products,
the EU attempts to harmonize and standardize the regulations govern-
ing those products, or the regulatory schemes which grant those goods
access to markets.8 6 If a good is novel, not previously used for human
8 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R, 335-36 (Sept. 26, 2006).
82 Id.
a If only one of the parties in a WTO dispute is party to the Cartagena Protocol, the WTO
is in no position to extend the enforceability of the Cartagena Protocol to an unwilling
party. Id.
LOUKAS TsOUKALIs, TBE NEW EUROPEAN ECONOMY REVISITED 10-11 (Oxford 1997).
85DOMINIK LASOK, THE CUSTOMS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 140-45
(2d ed., 1990); Case 120/78, Rewe-ZentralAGv. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfiir Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979) (establishing the principle ofmutual recognition);
see also Mark Clough & Nicholas Forwood, The Single European Act and Free Movement:
Legal Implications of the Provision for the Completion of the Internal Market, 11 EURO. L.
REV. 383 (1986); Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Free Movement of Goods and Article 28: An
Evolving Framework, 27 EUR. L. REV. 408 (2002).
' Alasdair R. Young, The Single Market: A New Approach to Policy, in POLICY-MAKING
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 98-100 (Helen Wallace, William Wallace, & Mark A. Pollack
eds., 5th ed., 2005).
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consumption, the EU takes the initiative in establishing the regulatory
scheme to minimize regulatory conflict among the Member States. 87 GMOs
have only been sold since 1994.' Accordingly, the EU has coordinated the
approval process and regulation of GMOs since before their initial entry
into the European market with Regulation 90/220.89 Regulation 258/97
on Novel Foods and Directive 2001/18 on Deliberate Release (the revision
of 90/220) established the second incarnation of the EU GMO regulatory
system. Loopholes and discretions in the system led to a patchwork of
measures which complicated the approval and regulatory processes for each
party involved.9 ° Regulation 1829/2003 on Food and Feed and Regulation
1830/2003 on Traceability and Labeling superseded the prior measures
and brought some clarity to the EU's GMO regulatory regime." The major
measures will be explained, followed by a discussion of the changes in the
GMO approval system from an importer's perspective.
1. Regulation 258/97 on Novel Foods92
This Regulation was designed to establish the safety of novel
foods.93 Novel foods are defined as "foods and food ingredients that have
not been used for human consumption to a significant degree within the
Community before 15 May 1997."94 Accordingly, the EU sought to develop
a new regulatory scheme to apply to novel foods. The Regulation sought
to assure that the free movement of novel foods did not undermine the
87 Id. at 103-07 (describing the positive integration approach which includes common
authorization of new products like GMOs).
' Fredland, supra note 15, at 186; Overseas Development Institute, The Debate on
Genetically Modified Organisms: Relevance for the South, Briefing Paper 1 (Jan. 1999),
available at http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/briefing/l-99.html.8 9 Council Directive 90/220, on the Deliberate Release Into the Environment of Genetically
Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15 (EEC).
9 See Mark Mansour & Sarah Key, From Farm to Fork: The Impact on Global Commerce
of the New European Union Biotechnology Regulatory Scheme, 38 INT'L LAW. 55 (2004).
91 Ostrovsky, supra note 2, at 211; Schwartz, supra note 20 at 781.
92Within the system of EU legislation, a Regulation is binding on all Member States in
its exact form. A Directive is binding in intent, but each Member State has the liberty to
transpose the legislation as it sees fit in order to best achieve the aims of the Directive.
PAUL CRAIG & GRANNE DE BfJRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 106-09 (2d ed.,
1998).
93 Commission Regulation 258/97 concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients, 1997
O.J. (L 43) 1 (EC).
4 Director General for Health and Consumer Protection, Novel Foods-Introduction,
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/novelfood/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2009); Regulation 258/97, supra note 93, at 1.
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health and safety of the citizens and environments in other Member
States .
An importer or maker of a novel food, including a GMO, first had
to gain approval from the Member State in which they intended to sell
or release the novel food.96 In order to do this, the party seeking approval
had to apply to the relevant approval body in that Member State. 9v The
approval body in the Member State conducted an initial assessment.9" A
copy of the application and the assessment were forwarded to the European
Commission so that they could be reviewed, prepared for circulation
among the Member States, and sent to the other Member States for
review by their approval bodies.99
If the initial assessment was favorable and no other Member State
raised any reasoned objections, 10 then the novel food could be placed on
the market.' If the initial assessment was not favorable or reasoned objec-
tions were raised, then Regulation 258/97 called for further procedures.' 2
During the review process, "[t]he applicant shall, where a Member
State so requests, provide a copy of any pertinent information appearing
in the request."0 3 If the initial assessment was not favorable, then addi-
tional assessments may have taken place, which would have required
further information from the applicant." Based on these assessments
or any other studies conducted within each Member State, the Member
States could put forward "reasoned objections."' 5
Based on these, the Commission took control of the approval
process. The Commission considered the objections and concerns of the
Member States and drafted authorization measures.'06 These authoriza-
tion measures may have conditioned the use of the novel food, designated
the customs specification for the novel food, and/or required specific label-
ing for the novel food.' The Council then voted by qualified majority to
9' Regulation 258/97, supra note 93, at 1.
96Id. at art. 4(1).
97 Id.
9" Id. at art. 4(2), art. 6.
99Id. at art. 4(3).1
" Regulation 258/97, supra note 93, at art. 6(4).
'01 Id. at art. 4(2).
102 Id. at art. 6(3)-(4).
'
03 Id. at art. 6(4).
'04 Id. at art. 6(3), art. 7.
'05 Regulation 258/97, supra note 93, at art. 6(4).
'06 Id. at art. 13.
'07 Id. at art. 7(2).
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approve the measures.' If the Council failed to act within three months,
then the Commission adopted and implemented the authorization mea-
sures. °9 Either by affirmative Council approval or by time lapse default,
the novel food could enter the EU market under certain conditions. If the
Council flatly rejected the conditions, then the novel food could not enter
the EU market.
2. Directive 2001/18 on Deliberate Release"0°
This Directive sought to establish a comprehensive GMO approval
process, based on the precautionary principle,"' which would do the utmost
to protect human health and the environment." 2 The Directive defined
GMO release as either "deliberate release into the environment... for
any other purpose than placing [into the EU market]" or "placing on the
market genetically modified organisms as or in products within the [EU
market] ."'13 Deliberate release was further defined as "any intentional
introduction into the environment... for which no specific containment
measures are used to limit [GMO] contact with and to provide a high level
of safety for the general population and the environment.""' In short,
the Directive covered all attempts at growing or selling GMOs in the
European Union except those with a strictly scientific purpose."5
Each applicant had to carry out an environmental assessment be-
fore submitting notice of an intent to deliberately release a GMO or place
it in the EU market."6 This assessment required an "evaluation of risks
108 Id. at art. 13(4)(b). Qualified majority voting is the system by which the Council of the
EU makes most of its economic policy decisions. The Council is made of representatives
of each Member State. Each Member State is afforded a certain number ofvotes, roughly
based on population. In order to reach a qualified majority, roughly two thirds (2/3) of the
possible votes must vote in favor of the proposed legislation. CRAIG & DE BURcA, supra
note 92, at 142-43 (2d ed., 1998). As applied in this context, each Member State gets
another chance to express its disapproval of the novel food's entry into the EU market.
1"9 Regulation 258/97, supra note 93, at art. 13(4).
1 0 See supra note 92 for an explanation of the legal significance of a Directive within the
European Union.
" See supra note 4.
112Council Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically
modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1,
art. 1 (EC); see also id. at art. 32 (indicating that the Directive is intended to be the EU's
implementation of the Cartagena Protocol); supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
113 Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 112, at art. 1.
114 Id. at art. 2(3).
115 Id. at art. 2(4).
116 Id. at art. 4(2).
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to human health and the environment, whether direct or indirect, imme-
diate or delayed, which the deliberate release or the placing on the market
of GMOs may pose."" 7 Applicants also had to submit a plan for monitoring
the impact and effects of the GMO release"' and its entry in the
market."9 Procedures for dealing with emergencies which might have
arisen based on new information also had to be included. 120
Based on all this information, the competent authority in a Member
State would begin the approval process. Similar to Regulation 258/97, the
Member State conducted its own evaluation of the applicant's notification
materials and formulated an assessment.'2 ' The Member State had to
make the applicant's notification materials available to the Commission,
so that it could be available to each of the Member States upon request. 122
Each Member State and the Commission also had to allow for public con-
sultation on the approval of the GMO for deliberate release. 23 The Member
State's authority could take into account any comments raised by other
Member States in making its decision.124 If the Member State's authority
decided to approve the GMO for entry into the market, it could only autho-
rize its deliberate release for up to ten years.'25 Approvals for the intro-
duction into the EU market served to allow for the free circulation of the
GMO among all the Member States.'26
Even after member states authorized an applicant to release the
GMO or introduce it into the EU market, monitoring and testing of the
GMO had to continue.'27 If any new information came to light which
affected the terms of the Member State's consent for release, the compe-
tent authority in the Member State could modify the terms of the consent,
even to the point of terminating it.12
8
117 Id. at art. 2(8). Specifically, the assessment had to include adequate analysis of the
direct effects of the GMO, its indirect effects, its immediate effects, its delayed effects,
and its cumulative, long-term effects. See Council Directive 2001118, supra note 112, at
Annex II.1 8 Id. at art. 6(2)(a)(v).
119 Id. at art. 13(2)(c), art. 13(2)(e).
120 Id. at art. 6(2)(a)(vi), art. 13(6).
121 Id. at art. 6(3)-(5), art. 14.
122 Council Directive 2001118, supra note 112, at art. 11, art. 14(2).
123 Id. at art. 9, art. 24.
12A Id. at art. 6(5), art. 15(1); see also id. at art. 18.
125 Id. at art. 13(2)(d).
126 Id. at art. 22.
12 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
12 Council Directive 200118, supra note 112, at art. 8, art. 20.
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Once member states approved a GMO for deliberate release into
the environment, only the discovery of new adverse information could
justify revocation of consent. GMOs which have permission to enter the
market must seek renewed consent from the Member State authority to
whom they originally applied.'29 Applicants had to file an abbreviated
notice packet which reported the results of monitoring efforts, any new
information regarding the safety of the GMO in question, and a proposal
for amending the conditions of original consent. 3 0 The competent author-
ity then completed another assessment of the GMO to determine whether
it should remain on the market, and under what conditions.' 3 ' In making
its decision, the competent authority had to take into account the well-
reasoned objections from the Commission and other Member States. 32
Member States had to present their objections and reach a consensus on
the renewal application within a very strict time frame. 33
At any time, any Member State could activate the Directive's Safe-
guard provisions and refuse to allow the continued circulation or presence
of a GMO in its territory. 34 This decision could be based on "new or addi-
tional scientific knowledge, [having] detailed grounds for considering that
a GMO as or in a product which has been properly notified and [have] re-
ceived written consent under this Directive constitutes a risk to human
health or the environment. " 135 A Member State taking such actions effec-
tively restarts the applicant's consent process because the Commission, the
Member States, and the Council would have acted to modify the conditions
for the GMO's entry into the market, or revoke the consent altogether.
136
3. Regulations 1829/2003 & 1830/2003 on Labeling and Traceability
These regulations sought to clarify the patchwork of labeling and
traceability rules left by the implementation of Directive 2001/18, Regu-
lation 1139/98, Regulation 49/2000, and Regulation 50/2000.13
'
29 Id. at art. 17. The Directive did not require that an applicant file for renewal with the
Member State authority originally granting consent. If the applicant would choose to apply
through another Member State, the application process would begin again per art. 15.130 Id. at art. 17(2)(a)-(d).
131 Id. at art. 17(3).
132 Id. at art. 17(4)-(8), art. 18.
1
3 3 Id.
" Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 112, at art 23(1).
13 5 Id.
136 Id. at art. 23(2); see also arts. 28-31 (outlining the procedures for communication and
decision making among the Member States and the organs of the EU).
137 Mansour & Key, supra note 90, at 55-56 (citing Commission Regulation 1829/2003 on
genetically modified food and feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, para. 5-19 (EC)).
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Under Directive 2001/18, each Member State created its own rules
on traceability and labeling in accordance with the monitoring and emer-
gency response plans needed for individual GMO approval. 3 ' Regulation
178/2002 established new rules for the coordination of the GMO approval
process by "laying down the general principles and requirements of food
law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority, and laying down
procedures in matters of food safety."'39 The result was a burdensome in-
consistent system which effectively prevented the free circulation of
approved GMO products in the EU market.4 ° Regulations 1829/2003 &
1830/2003 try to resolve some of the problems in the system by defining
traceability, providing clear objectives to be served by the traceability
system, and facilitating implementation of a comprehensive traceability
and labeling system for GMOs.1'4
Regulation 1829/2003 addresses the issue by reframing and clari-
fying the application process for the entry of a new GMO, either food or
feed, into the EU market.4 2 As in Directive 2001/18, parties seeking to in-
troduce GMO foods into the EU market must submit an extensive applica-
tion to the competent Member State authority. "i' The competent Member
State authority, however, must work more closely with the EFSA, other
Member States, and other EU level scientific bodies in formulating its
opinion on the GMO and in designing the methods for monitoring and trac-
ing the GMO through its production and distribution.'" The competent
Member State authority must submit its draft opinion to the Commission
so that it can formulate a final decision which takes into account "any rele-
vant provisions of Community law and other legitimate factors relevant
to the matter under consideration."4 The final decision is then submitted
to the Council Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health for
its approval.'46 This committee is comprised of individuals nominated by
various EU Member States with expertise in the fields of GMOs, food
138 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
139 Commission Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, 2003 O.J.
(L 268) 1, para. 9 (EC) (citing Commission Regulation 178/2002,2002 O.J. (L 31) 1, 1 (EC)).
"4 See Mansour & Key, supra note 90, at 56.
141Id.
142 Commission Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, 2003 O.J.
(L 268) 1, art. 3-7 (EC).
'
43 Id. at art. 5.
14Id. at art. 6.
14 Id. at art. 7(1).
'4Id. at art. 7.
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supply safety, animal health, marketing, and other stakeholders such
as consumer rights.'47 A favorable decision by the Committee grants the
GMO permission for entry into the EU market for no more than ten
years."4 The decision of the Committee is final.'49
After a GMO food is authorized, the Member State authority must
continue to monitor the GMO food.15° Based on information gained through
supervision, or the request of another Member State, the Member State
authority may suspend, modify, or revoke the authorization granting the
GMO access to the EU market at any time.' 5 ' If the Member State author-
ity suspends, modifies, or revokes the authorization, the Commission and
the Committee must review and update the terms of the authorization
in the same manner in which the authorization was initially granted.'52
Renewals of authorizations follow a similar procedure.5 3 Approximately
the same procedures apply for GMO feed as well.'
Both GMO food and GMO feed must be labeled to indicate the
presence of GMOs above a certain threshold. GMO producers must label
the product if more than 0.9% of the product contains GMO or if residual
GMOs (less than 0.9%) were not adventitious or technically avoidable. 55
For both food and feed, intermediate handlers and end consumers must
be able to clearly identify which products contain GMOs and find an iden-
tification number for each GMO in the food or feed.5 6 Further, the label
must also indicate whether the GMO changes the composition, nutritional
value, intended use, or the health implications for any segment of the
human or animal population respectively.' 57 These provisions are aimed
to keep consumers and every operator in the supply chain alert to poten-
tial and actual impacts of GMOs present in the EU market. 5 '
To further facilitate this end, Regulation 1829/2003 established
certain community level procedures and institutions. A Community
.
47 Id. at art. 35 [hereinafter "the Committee"]; Commission Regulation 178/2002, 2002
O.J. (L 31) 1, art. 58 (EC).
s Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at art. 7(5).
149 See Commission Decision 2004/614, concerning the creation of an advisory group on
the food chain and animal and plant health, 2004 O.J. (L 275) 17 (EC).
'50Id. at art. 9.
151 Id. at art. 10(1).
1 52 Id. at art. 10(2).
153 MI. at art. 11.
1 Id. at arts. 15-23.
115 Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at art. 12(2), art. 24(2).
1 6Id. at art. 13, art. 25.
157Id.
" Id. at art. 1(a).
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Register keeps track of all the GMOs in the EU market.'59 A Community
Reference Laboratory serves as the nerve center of all the Member State
laboratories conducting studies regarding GMOs. 160 The Community
Reference Laboratory may also serve as the arbiter of scientific disputes
among Member State laboratories regarding conflicting studies of GMOs
under review for access to the EU market.'6' Furthermore, the Member
States and the EU level institutions must make all information and docu-
ments concerning the GMO authorization process available for public
access.'62 Throughout the application and monitoring processes, the public
is given the opportunity to comment on the findings and decisions of the
Member State and EU level scientific and decision making bodies.'63 The
protection of confidential and proprietary information from the applicants,
though, is ensured.'
Regulation 1830/2003 complements the labeling system in Regu-
lation 1829/2003 by orienting it towards clear traceability goals. The trace-
ability provisions are intended to apply to any food or feed product made
from or containing GMOs above the 0.9% threshold set in Regulation
1829/2003.165 The traceability rules apply to any operator. 66 An operator
is broadly defined as "any natural or legal person who places a product on
the market or who receives [such] a product.., at any stage of the pro-
duction and distribution chain, but does not include the final consumer. "167
Each operator must ensure that the next operator down the supply chain
or the final consumer is aware of the specific GMOs contained in the prod-
uct in question. 16 To facilitate traceability, each GMO is assigned an
alphanumeric code, known as a 'unique identifier,' which must be pres-
ent on the label in order to identify the specific GMO. 169 The Community
Register keeps track of unique identifiers and relevant information about
the GMO to which each unique identifier corresponds. 7 ° All operators
159 Id. at art. 28.
160 Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at art. 32, Annex.
161 Id. at Annex.
162 Id. at art. 29.
16 Id. at art. 4(2)(b), art. 6(7), art. 9(1), art. 10(1), art. 17(2)(b)(ii), art. 18(7), art. 21(1),
art. 22(1), art. 28(2).
'64 Id. at art. 30 (Confidentiality), art. 31 (Data Protection).1 6 5 Council Regulation 1830/2003 on genetically modified food and feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268)
24, art. 2 (EC); see supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
"6 Council Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20, at art. 4(A)(1), art. 4(B)(6), art. 5(1).
167 Id. at art. 3(5).
1 68 Id. at art. 4(B), art. 5.
169 Id. at art. 3(4), art. 8.
171 Id. at art. 28; see also supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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must keep records of all the GMOs they handle for five years.17' With this
system in place, any threat to human health, animal health, or the envi-
ronment can be quickly addressed by tracing the movements of the GMO
and facilitating its removal from the market and/or the environment.
In order to enforce these provisions, Member States retain the
right to design and implement penalties for violation of the provisions
in these directives as long as the penalties are "effective, proportionate,
and dissuasive." 72
4. Changes in the GMO Regulatory System from an Importer's
Perspective
The EU's GMO regulatory scheme has followed a basic formula
for approving the entry of GMOs into the EU market.'73 First, importers
must file an application for approval. This application includes scientific
studies about the GMO in question and its potential impacts. Second, the
Member State authority evaluates the application. Other Member States
also evaluate the application themselves. Third, all the Member States
confer and decide whether to approve, reject, or approve the GMO's entry
into the market with conditions. Fourth, the importer and the Member
States continue to monitor and research the GMO. If any negative infor-
mation about the GMO emerges, then the Member States engage the fifth
part of the formula: a re-evaluation of the GMO's status in the EU market.
Importers seeking approval under Regulation 258/97 only had to
conduct a limited assessment of the GMO in question. Other Member
States could request more information from the importer. In the process
of determining whether or how the GMO may enter into the EU market,
the Commission or the Council could continue to contact the importer in
order to develop terms and conditions for the GMO's entry. '14 This pro-
cess of consultation, however, was completely discretionary.175 If approved,
171 Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20, at art. 4(A)(4), art. 5(2).
172 Id. at art. 11; Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at art. 45.
173 The statements in this paragraph summarize the measures explained throughout
Parts II.B.1-3.174 See e.g., Mark A. Pollack, Theorizing EU Policy Making, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 13, 42-45 (Helen Wallace, William Wallace, & Mark A. Pollack eds.,
2005) (describing the theory of deliberative decision making in the EU where "societal
actors engage in a sincere collective search... for the best available public policy.") Id.
at 43.
175 Id. at 44 (noting that actual evidence of deliberation in the practice of EU policy making
is limited).
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the importer would have to abide by specific terms, such as labeling and
monitoring requirements.
The 2001 Directive increased the importer's responsibility in the
GMO approval and regulatory scheme. Importers were required to conduct
more extensive impact studies before submitting applications. Also, the
application included importer generated monitoring plans and emergency
response plans to detect and prevent any threats the GMO might be de-
termined to pose in the future. As before, the other Member States could
weigh in on the approval decision. Additionally, the public was given a
voice under this Directive. Thus, the importer should have considered
the influence of other groups, which were given a voice in the approval
process, in deciding when and where to submit an application. Though the
Directive implied that Member States took a larger role in monitoring the
GMO, it also increased the say of all Member States when an importer
sought renewal of approval for the GMO to remain on the EU market.
The importer effectively had to apply for approval again, albeit with an
abbreviated application.
Under the Directive, the importer always had to be wary about
new scientific discoveries regarding the GMO. If new evidence emerged,
either from independent scientific research or monitoring of the GMO on
the market, any Member State could start proceedings to modify, if not
terminate, approval of the GMO's presence on the EU market. In short,
the importer had to continually assess the potential impact of its GMO in
every Member State.
Under Regulation 1829/2003 the importer must submit a similar
application to the competent Member State authority as under Directive
2001/18.176 The Regulation requires the immediate forwarding of the
application to the Commission and the other Member States. 77 The im-
porter, therefore, must be promptly ready to address the questions from
all Member States. Unlike under Directive 2001/18, however, the importer
does not bear primary responsibility for monitoring the GMO.17' Regula-
tion 1830/2003, however, forces the importer to follow very strict labeling
guidelines. 179 The labeling guidelines effectively make the importer re-
sponsible for providing every operator in the supply chain with adequate
information about the GMO. 18 ° There is some evidence that these labeling
176 Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at arts. 5, 17.
177 id.
178 Compare id.,passim with Council Directive 2001/18, supra note 112, at art. 20.
179 See Council Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20, at art. 4.
180 Id.
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requirements can be very burdensome."'8 As under Directive 2001/18, new
scientific evidence may give cause for the terms of the GMO's presence
on the EU market to change. The importer must exhibit a similar degree
of attentiveness to scientific changes.
The emphasis on a scientific basis for changes to GMO approvals
under Regulation 1829/2003 clarifies some ambiguity about Member State
discretion. Under all the GMO approval and regulation measures, the
Member States were granted broad discretion to comment on the GMO
and challenge its approval with reasoned argument.1 2 Regulation 178/2002
established, and Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 confirmed, the
importance of scientific evidence as the grounds for reasoned argument
regarding GMOs. 83 In other words, objections to the entry of a GMO into
the EU market must be supported by scientific evidence. Though a polit-
ical process ultimately provides approval of a GMO's entry into the EU
market,'84 importers can rest assured that the decision will be heavily
informed by scientific evidence.
The evolution of GMO approval in the EU tells a story of political
actors using science to address the concerns of the European public. EU
sentiments on GMOs, however, still find policy expression in the precau-
tionary principle.'85 While science has addressed some of these concerns,
the precautionary principle can be used to justify further restrictions on
GMOs.8 6 In other words, other policy areas may be used by Europeans to
find expression of their GMO concerns.
III. LEGAL REGIMES REGULATING CUSTOMS PROCEDURES
Customs rules are among the oldest features of the international
order." 7 As governments have become more democratic, so too has the
1 8 1 NICHOLAS KALAiTZANDONAKES, THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE BIoSAFETY PROTOCOL
ON AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY TRADE 11-23, IPC TECHNOLOGY ISSUE BRIEF (International
Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, 2004), available at http://www.canadagrains
council.ca/uploads/BSP PaperFinal.pdf.
182 Chalmers, supra note 18, at 653-54.
18 Id. at 653-57 (describing the scientific dialectic present in the GMO approval regime).
'4See id. at 658 (discussing the process of turning scientific evidence and argument into
a political decision made by the Regulatory Committee); Gitanjali Deb, Atrazine: A Case
Study in the Differences between Regulations of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals in the EU
and the US, 25 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 173, 177-79 (2006) (describing the combined
process of scientific review and political approval).
1 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
186 Id.
187 TIMOTHY LYONS, EC CUSTOMS LAW 2 (Oxford 2001).
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responsibility for customs spread across multiple institutions. Govern-
mental bodies ranging from the international to the local have some in-
fluence on the rules and application of the international customs regime.
This section summarizes the international and EU level customs regula-
tion systems.
A. International Customs System. 8
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the World Customs
Organization ("WCO") have the most pervasive impact on customs re-
gimes around the world. Specific to Europe, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe brings perspectives from the United States and
Canada to political and policy issues in the customs regime."8 9 A discus-
sion of each organization and its influences follows.
1. The World Trade Organization and EU Customs Law
Since their inception as the GATT, the WTO agreements have
aimed to reduce the number and impact of tariffs in order to facilitate
trade. 9 ° Each round of GATT/WTO negotiations has further reduced the
customs duties levied on traded goods.' 9 ' Accordingly, the conclusion of
each trade round affects which goods have customs duties levied on them
and the value of those duties.
The WTO also concerns itself with the manner in which each
member operates its customs system.'92 Article 10 of the GATT requires
that no customs measures take effect until they are published "in such
a manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted
with them."'93 Further, each party to the WTO agreements has a duty
to "administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its
[customs] laws, regulations, decisions and rulings"'94 and to provide for
"the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to
" Id. at 6-18; LuX, supra note 26, at 10-18.
189 Lux, supra note 26, at 17.
190 JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAvEY, & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 343 (4th ed. 2002); MATSUSHITAET AL., supra note
28, at 1-3.
'91 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 610.
192 See GATT, supra note 69, at art. X.
193 Id. at art. X(1)-(2).
194 Id. at art. X(3)(a).
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customs matters."95 Therefore, the WTO agreements also seek to ensure
the fairness and uniformity of the manner in which a party administers
its customs regime.
The WTO agreements have two direct impacts on the EU's customs
regime. First, the EU has adopted the result of each round of trade nego-
tiations since the European Community began negotiating at the WTO
on behalf of its members.'96 The schedule of concessions is like a treaty
adopted by each party to the agreement.'97 Accordingly, the terms of cus-
toms duties negotiated at the WTO level largely populate the EU's tariff
schedule.'98
Second, parties to the WTO can enforce the terms of the WTO agree-
ments against each other through the Dispute Settlement Understanding
("DSU").'99 If a WTO Member feels the measures and acts of another
Member have violated its rights under the agreements, then it can request
that a panel decide the dispute under the DSU.2"0 The DSU encourages
parties to settle their disputes,201 but is prepared to adjudicate trade mat-
ters in order to "provid[e] security and predictability to the multilateral
trading system."2 °2 Accordingly, customs duties that deviate from the
WTO's schedule can be the basis for suit before the DSU. °3 Customs re-
gimes that operate contrary to Article X can also be the basis for suit,
though this option is rarely used.20 4
195 Id. at art. X(3)(b).
196 LYONS, supra note 188, at 11; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 11-12 (describing
the process of accession which requires consensus among all WTO members after the
negotiation of specific terms of accession and adoption of the most current WTO schedule,
implying that current members abide by the most recent schedule).
197 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment, 84, WTIDS62, 67 & 68/AB/R (June 22, 1998) ("the concessions
provided for in that Schedule are part of the terms of the treaty").
18 LASOK, supra note 85, at 13 (noting that, per GATT Article XXIV, "the duties and other
regulations of commerce are not higher or more restrictive with regard to third countries.").
1" DSU, supra note 28, at art. 1(1).20oId. at art. 3(1), (3); see supra note 56 (discussing nullification and impairment as grounds
for bringing cases before the Dispute Settlement Body).
201 DSU, supra note 28, at art. 3(7) ("A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a
dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred.").
202 Id. at art. 3(2).
203 GATT, supra note 69, at art. 2(5).
2 4 Id. at art. 10; see supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text; see also Daniel H. Erskine,
The U.S.-EC Dispute Over Customs Matters: Trade Facilitation, Customs Unions, and the
Meaning of WTO Obligations, 18 FLA. J. INTL L. 423, 431-32, 443-48 (only finding two
DSU panels constituted for the purpose of considering an alleged violation of Article X:
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These principles ofWTO law apply generally to all WTO members.
WTO rules, however, have a particular relationship within the EUs legal
system as it applies to customs law. The European Court of Justice has
held that the Community Customs Code ("CCC") must, "as far as possible,
be interpreted in a manner consistent with [the WTO] agreements."2 °5
Although the effects of the GATT on the CCC are relatively straightfor-
ward, other questions of the scope and effects of the WTO agreements are
left to the ECJ to help ensure consistency among the Member States.20 6
Though litigants in European courts cannot directly rely upon the GATT
agreements as the basis for a suit,20 7 the legality of a Community act can
be challenged on grounds that it violates the GATT, if the act itself was
intended to be part of the GATT framework. 20  This leaves the possibility
that "one day some provision specific enough" might create rights in the
WTO agreements for citizens and importers affected by the EU's customs
209
regime.
2. World Customs Organization and EU Customs Law
The WCO advises the global community on customs matters to-
wards the goal of facilitating international trade.210 The WCO exerts great
Panel Report, Dominican Republic-MeasuresAffecting the Importation and Internal Sale
of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, I 7.388, 7.390, 7.392 (Nov. 26, 2004), and Appellate Body
Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 199 (Sept. 9, 1997)).
20 5Joined Cases 21/72-24172, International Fruit Company v. Produktschap voor Groenten
en Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 18 (1972); Case T-256/97, Bureau Europ~en des Unions de
Consommateurs (BEUC) v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 11-101, 65 (2000).
206 LYONS, supra note 188, at 15 (citing Case 266/81, SocietA Italiana per l'Oleodotto
Transalpino (SIOT) v. Ministere italien des finances, Ministere della Marine Mercantile,
Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste, & Ente Autonomo del Porto di Trieste, [1983] E.C.R.
731, [ 14 & 15 (1983) & Joined Cases 267/81-269/81, Amministrazione delle Finance
dello Stato v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI),
[19831 E.C.R. 801, 105 (1983)).
207 CRAIG & DE BIORcA, supra note 92, at 180 (citing International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R. at
1237-38).
" Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-4973, 5073-74 (1994); see generally
LYONS, supra note 188, at 15-18 (discussing the applicability of the WTO agreements in
the EU legal context).
209 Lord Slynn of Hadley, Foreword to THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAw
(Nicholas Emilou & David OKeefe eds., John Wiley and Sons 1996); see also Case C-469/93
Ammistrazione delle Finanze dello State v. Chiquita Italia SpA, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4533,1-4543,
21 (1995).
210 World Customs Organization, About Us, http'//www.wcoomd.org/home-aboutus.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
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influence on all customs regimes because it maintains the Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System ("HS").2 n Almost all countries
use the HS as the basis for their customs codes.212 By setting the stan-
dards for classification, the WCO effectively sets the customs agenda both
when customs rules are applied and when they are created.213
The EU adopted the HS as the nomenclature system for its cus-
toms code in 1987.214 The EU regularly transposes the WCO's HS recom-
mendations and amendments into EU law.215 This does not mean that the
EU has chosen to have the WCO decide the customs classifications of all
products imported into the EU.216 The ECJ, however, holds the WCO's
explanatory notes as "authoritative in the interpretation of [the CCCI ...
in the absence of any relevant Community provision."21 7 Further the EU
has signed on to the international conventions promulgated by the WCO,
which seek to harmonize customs procedures.21 ' The EU, though, signaled
accession to these conventions through Council Directives.219 Directives
leave the specific terms of implementation to each Member State.22 ° The
extent of harmonization of customs procedures among the Member States
and with the rest of the global trading community, therefore, has always
remained at the discretion of the Member States.
3. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and
other United Nations Conventions and EU Law
As a largely political organization, the United Nations ("UN") serves
as a platform for international cooperation on policy.22' Since the wake
211 World Customs Organization, What is the Harmonized System (HS)?, http'//www .wcoomd.
org/homewcotopicsjhsoverviewboxeshsharmonizedsystem.htm (last visited Jan. 28,2009).
212 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 360.
213 LYONS, supra note 188, at 6 (commenting that the WCO is "immensely powerful"); see
also World Customs Organization, supra note 211 (noting that the WCO"administers the
technical aspects of the WTO Agreements on Customs Valuation and Rules of Origin").
214 Council Regulation 2658/87 On the Tariff and Statistical Nomenclature and on the
Common Customs Tariff, 1987 O.J. (L 256) 4.
215 Lux, supra note 26, at 15-17.
216 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 20(3)(b)-(g).
217 LASOK, supra note 85, at 196 (citing Case 14/70, Bakels v. Oberfinanzdirektion Munchen,
[1970] E.C.R. 1439, 1450 (1970); Case 60/83, Metro International v. Oberfinazdirektion
MUnchen, [1984] E.C.R. 671 (1984), and Case 46/83, Gerlach v. Inspecteur de Invoerrechten,
[1984] E.C.R. 841 (1984)).
21" LYONS, supra note 188, at 7-9.
219 See id.
220 CRAIG & DE BIJRCA, supra note 92, at 108.
221 See THOMAS G. WEISS, DAvI P. FORSYTHE, & ROGER A. COATE, THE UNITED NATIONS
AND CHANGING WORLD POLITICS xxii-xxiii (Westview Press 2001).
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of World War II, the UN Economic Commission for Europe ("UNECE") has
pursued an agenda of fostering economic cooperation in Europe with the
aim of enhancing prosperity.22 2 Towards that end, agreements affecting
customs procedures in the area of transit and temporary importation have
emerged from the UNECE forum.223 Other UN bodies, such as the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ("UNESCO")
and the Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora, promulgate agreements that also impact customs
procedures.224
The EU takes part in these international conventions by transpos-
ing their terms into EU legal documents.225 While the EU participates
fully in these international fora, the transposition process signals the ex-
tent ofEU support for the international agreements and recommendations
in question.226 The EU transposes international agreements that it in-
tends to adopt as regulations, because of their binding nature. 227 For ex-
ample, the EU adopted the International Convention on Harmonization
on Frontier Control of Goods and the Convention on International Trade
of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora as regulations.228 Inter-
national agreements transposed as Council Decisions are not necessarily
binding on any EU institution or Member State unless the directive spe-
cifically designates the addressee to be bound.229 The UN's Customs Con-
vention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles was only
adopted as a decision addressed to the European Union at large,23 ° thereby
222 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Inception, http://www.unece.org/
oes/history/history.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
223 Lux, supra note 26, at 17-18.
' LYONS, supra note 188, at 10-11.
225 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 92, at 106-07.
" See, e.g., Christian Lequesne, Fisheries Policy: Letting the Little Ones Go?, in POLICY-
MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 353, 357, 365 (Helen Wallace, William Wallace, &
Mark A. Pollack eds., 5th ed. 2005). In the field of fisheries policy, the EU did not adopt
the non-binding recommendations of the International Council for the Exploration of the
Sea ("ICES"), but rather reacted to the recommendations of the International Commission
for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna ("ICCAT') by creating binding Total Allowable
Catches ("TACs") system for Atlantic Tuna. Id.
227 CRAIG & DE BfiRcA, supra note 92, at 106-07.
' Council Regulation 1262184, Concerning the Conclusion of the International Convention
on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods, 1985 O.J. (L 126) 1 (EC); Council
Regulation 3626/82, On the Implementation in the Community of the Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 1982 O.J. (L 384) 1 (EC).
9 CRAIG & DE BfiRCA, supra note 92, at 109.
Council Decision 94/110, On the Conclusion of the Customs Convention on the
Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles (1954) and the Acceptance of the United
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assigning responsibility for the Convention's implementation to no one.
Ultimately, the EU can exercise full discretion in the adoption of customs
agreements proposed by the UN.
B. EU Customs System
The EU is a customs union and a common market.23' As such the
EU maintains a common external tariff232 while striving to eliminate the
internal barriers that limit the free movement of goods, services, persons,
and capital.233 In the pursuit of cogent and coherent policies, there may
be no difference between measures with intra-EU effect and extra-EU
effect.234 Nonetheless, the EU's Community Customs Code ("CCC") lays the
foundation for the application of the common external tariff.23 An outline
of the CCC and the powers of the Member States under the CCC follows.
1. The EU Community Customs Code (CCC)
The EU's predecessor, the European Community, maintained a
CCC since 1968.236 Over the next two decades the customs code and its
implementing legislation expanded and fragmented as more countries
joined the European Community 37 and the WTO advanced through more
rounds of tariff concessions.238 The EU's creation in 1992 signaled a re-
newed commitment to fully realizing economic union, and the current CCC
emerged as a step in the process of achieving that goal.239
Nations' Resolution of 2 July 1993 on the Applicability of Carnets de Passage en Douane
and CPD Carnets to Private Road Vehicles, art. 1, 1994 O.J. (L 56) 1 (EC).
"' Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) arts. 30,
48, 52, 59, 67, 100, Mar. 3, 1957, 294 U.N.T.S. 11; see Young, supra note 86, at 95.
2 See Melvyn B. Krauss, Recent Developments in Customs Union Theory:An Interpretive
Survey, 10 J. ECON. LITERATURE 413, 413 (1972) (discussing the effect that coupling a
common external tariff with an elimination of protection among domestic producers has
on the overall balance between creating and diverting trade).233 TsOUKALIS, supra note 84, at 13.
' Lux, supra note 26, at 30-31 (listing a series of policies that affect both the common
market and customs policies).
23 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 2.
238 LYONS, supra note 188, at 18.237 Id. at 19.
3 JACKSON ET AL., supra note 191, at 227.
m LYONS, supra note 188, at 19.
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The CCC sets out the basic rules for "trade between the [EU] and
third countries" and for certain goods within the EU.24 ° Customs officers
supervise the movement of goods into, out of, and through the EU to deter-
mine their status as EU or non-EU goods.24' The determination of this
status dictates which, if any, customs rules apply.242 The CCC sets out
rules for making this determination,243 as well as rules for the classifica-
tion of goods,2" their warehousing,245 their transit,246 and their release
onto the market,24 to name a few. The CCC, however, leaves specifics of
many customs procedures to the Member States, or for later determina-
tion by the Customs Committee.24
Article 247 of the CCC establishes the customs committee. 249 As
the CCC has been implemented, the Customs Committee, with the help
of the Commission and other EU level bodies,25 ° has promulgated regula-
tions to help standardize customs procedures and solve common problems
among the EU member states.251 The most important common procedure
in the customs system is the common customs classification code known
as the TARIC 2 The TARIC uses the Common Nomenclature and codes
for goods promulgated by the WCO as its base and adds other digits for
use by EU and the Member States.253 Other significant common systems
under the CCC are the system for computerized customs declarations2 4
and the simplified customs declaration procedure. 5
240 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 1.
1 Id. at art. 37; see Lux, supra note 26, at 225-26.
242 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 20.
2
'Id. at arts. 22-27.
Id. at art. 12.
5 Id. at arts. 98-113.
'6 Id. at arts. 91-97.
" Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 79-83.
24 Id. at arts. 247-50.249 Id. at art. 247.
250 Erskine, supra note 205, at 435-36.
251 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at arts. 248-49.
252 Council Regulation 2658/87, Tariff and Statistical Nomenclature and Common Customs
Tariff, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L 256) 4 (EEC) (last amended by Council Regulation 493/2005,
Amending Annex I to Regulation (EEC) 2658/87, 2005 O.J. (L 082) 1).
25 Panel Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/R, 2.5 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter EC-Frozen Chicken].
2 Commission Regulation 2454/93, Laying Down Provisions for the Implementation of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 Establishing the Community Customs Code, arts.
222-24, 1993 O.J. (L 253) 1 (EC).
2-5 Id. at arts. 253-89.
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2. Member State Power under the EU Customs Code
Ultimately, Member States implement the CCC. While the CCC
seeks a common approach to customs, the CCC itself recognizes that an
effective customs system must allow "customs authorities... [to] carry
out all the controls they deem necessary to ensure that customs legisla-
tion is correctly applied."256 Rather than try and create an EU level cus-
toms service, Member States each bear responsibility for forming and
maintaining an "effective customs service... [so] not to put at risk the
economic benefits of the Single Market and the security of European
citizens."257
This responsibility allows for broad discretion on many customs
matters. Most significantly, Member States can exercise independent
judgment in the classification of imported goods. Article 12 of the CCC
creates the Binding Tariff Information ("BTI") mechanism.2" Based on
information provided by an importer, a customs authority can judge the
TARIC classification of a good, 2 9 binding all the customs authorities
to that TARIC classification °.2 " A BTI is valid for six years or until an
EU regulation makes it invalid.26' Customs authorities must inform the
Commission of each BTI, thereby giving it an opportunity to correct in-
consistent BTIs through a regulation. 262 Due to the relatively involved
process for the adoption of regulations2 3 and the incredible volume of
BTIs issued yearly,264 inconsistencies in the BTIs are often not corrected
promptly.265 This effectively gives each Member State the ability to
classify goods as it sees fit, without regard for a consistent application
of the CCC and TARIC across the EU.266
25 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 13.
257 Helen Hartnell, Subregional Coalescence in European Regional Integration, 16 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 115, 167 n.228 (1997) (citation omitted).
258 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 12.
2159 Id. at art. 12(1)-(2).
260 Commission Regulation 2454/93, supra note 255, at arts. 6, 7, 10 & 11.
261 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 12(4)-(5).
262 Commission Regulation 245493, supra note 255, at art. 9.
26 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 249.
2
" EC-Frozen Chicken, supra note 254, at 7.264.
265 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2004 ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 175-76
(2005), available at http'//www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports Publications/
2005/2005_Trade PolicyAgenda/asset upload-file691_7312.pdf(lastvisited Feb. 18,2009);
see also Erskine, supra note 205, at 440 n.108.
266 See RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL P. CLOES, EUROPEAN UNION BUsINESS LAW: A GUIDE
TO LAW AND PRACTICE HANDBOOK 272 (West 1995).
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The CCC also grants Member States extensive freedoms to con-
duct appeals of customs decisions." 7 Importers challenging a decision by
a Member State's customs authority must initiate the appeal with the cus-
toms authority in that Member State.26' Further, Member States design
and implement their own appeals procedures.269 The ECJ has reiterated
this right on several occasions.7 In a recent case, the ECJ acknowledged
that an importer may appeal directly to a judicial tribunal, more adept at
interpreting EU law,27' if national law would permit it. 272 In summary,
importers must follow the appeals procedures of the Member State in
which the goods clear customs.
Outside of the CCC proper, Member States are allowed to dero-
gate from the CCC procedures in certain instances of significant national
interest. Citing Art. 30 of the EU treaty,27 3 a Member State may enforce
national measures which prohibit or restrict imports if
justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public
security; the protection of health and life of humans, ani-
mals or plants; the protection of national treasures pos-
sessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; [or] the
protection of industrial and commercial property.274
Further, Member States may impose stricter national measures for the
protection of the environment or the health, safety, or economic interest
of consumers. 275 Though the GMO approval process tries to take the
27 For a detailed exposition of the customs appeals process, see generally, Erskine, supra
note 205, at 448-51.
268 Council Regulation 2913/12, supra note 25, at art. 243.
269 Id. at art. 245.
270 Case 33/76, Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989; Case
811179, Amministrazione delle Stato v. Ariete, 1980 E.C.R. 2545, 2554-55; Case 826/79,
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello State v. MIRECO, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, 2574-75.
271 Case 45/76, Comet v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1976 E.C.R. 2043, 2053; see
KOEN LENAERTS, DuK ARTs & ROBERT BRAY, PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
57-60 (Sweet & Maxwell 1999).
272 Case 1/99, Kofisa Italia Sri v. Ministero delle Finanze, 43 (Unreported, Jan. 11,
2001), available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm (follow "Cases Lodged
Since 1989" link; then follow "C-1/99" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
" European Union Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 1, art. 30 [hereinafter
EU Treaties].
274 Lux, supra note 26, at 32.
275 Id. (citing EU Treaties, supra note 274, at arts. 95(4), 153(5), 176).
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interest of all the Member States into account,276 the Treaty terms allow
each Member State to still pursue these narrowly defined interests through
national customs procedures.
IV. THE EC-BIOTECH CASE
A. Summary of the Case
The EU's GMO and customs regimes laid the terms over which the
US and the EU fought in the EC-Biotech case. The US, Canada, and
Argentina ("Complaining Parties") together charged the EU with three
sets of violations of the WTO agreements. 7 First, the Complaining parties
alleged that the EU had a general moratorium in place preventing the ap-
proval of any GMOs from entering the EU market. 2 8 The parties argued
that the EU had allowed the GMO approval processes mandated by Regu-
lation 258/97 and Directive 2001118 to grind to a halt.27 s No new GMOs,
therefore, could gain the requisite approval to come onto the EU market.
Second, the Complaining Parties alleged that the EU had pre-
vented certain GMOs from entering the EU market in a manner incon-
sistent with WTO obligations.2"' The parties alleged that the moratoria
on certain products lacked an adequate scientific basis.21 Third, the
Complaining Parties challenged the legality of Member State bans on
certain GMOs justified on human health grounds.28 2 In their eyes, the
individual Member States failed to employ the proper scientific standards
to justify the bans on human health grounds.283
After three rounds of written and oral arguments over the course
of two years,28 4 the Panel reached its conclusions. Regarding the morato-
rium on GMO approval, the Panel determined that the EU had in fact put
a moratorium in place.28 Under Regulation 258/97 and Directive 200118,
approval of a GMO, even with terms and conditions, required a qualified
271 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
271 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291IR, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, 4 (Sept. 26, 2006).
2781 d. at 30-37, 41-44, 51-54.
2791 Id.; see supra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2 (describing the procedures under Regulation 258/97
and Directive 2001118).
2-80 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R, 44-46, 54-56 (Sept. 26, 2006).
281id.
282 Id. at 37-38, 46-50, 60-64.2MId.
261 World Trade Organization, supra note 9.
2 6 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 612-13.
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majority vote in the Council or in the Committee." 6 The Panel cited a joint
public statement from five EU countries indicating their intent to prevent
any new GMOs from entering the EU market.8 7 The combined votes of
these countries under the qualified majority system could effectively pre-
vent the approval of any new GMO from entering the EU market.288
The Panel found the general moratorium to be in violation of the
Annex C(1)(a), first clause and Article 8 of the SPS Agreement. 289 Annex
C(1)(a), first clause, requires that, "Members shall ensure, with respect to
any procedure to check and ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measures, that.., such procedures are undertaken and com-
pleted without undue delay.... " 29" Article 8 requires that, "Members
shall observe the provisions of Annex C in the operation of control, inspec-
tion and approval procedures ... for establishing tolerances for contami-
nants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and otherwise ensure that their
procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement."
291
The general moratorium violated Annex C(1)(a) because it caused an
impermissible delay in the application of at least one GMO, in turn vio-
lating Article 8.292
The moratorium was realized in part because applications for spe-
cific products failed to be approved.2 93 The Panel examined the rejected
and withdrawn applications to determine if the EU had taken actions,
distinct from the general moratorium, which violated the WTO agree-
ments. 294 The Panel found no other justification for the GMO ban which
violated the WTO agreements other than the general moratorium.295 Spe-
cifically, the Panel found no evidence indicating that the EU had based
its assessments on anything other than appropriate scientific reason-
ing.296 That specific products did not gain approval because of the general
216 See supra notes 95, 121, 124 and accompanying text.
" EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 434-37.
28Id. at 437-38.
289 Id. at 681-82.
29 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND
PHYTOSANITARYMEASURES, Annex C(1)(a) (1994), available at http'//www.wto.org/english/
docs-eflegale/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
2' Id. at art. 8.292 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291R at 658-81 (examining other permissible delays and determin-
ing that they alone could not explain the halt in GMO approvals).
23 Id. at 692-93.
294 Id. at 693.
29 Id. at 692-868.
2 Id. at 704-20.
[Vol. 33:9711004
GENTLY MODIFIED OPERATIONS
moratorium, the Panel recommended that the EU, "bring the relevant
product-specific measures into conformity with its obligations under the
SPS Agreement."29 v This means that the EU can no longer unduly delay
the applications for entry of GMOs onto the EU market.
Regarding the Member State bans, the Panel found that EU
Member States had supported their bans on individual GMOs with nei-
ther adequate risk assessments nor appropriate scientific information to
justify the bans. 29" Accordingly, the Member State bans stood in violation
of Article 2.2, which requires that WTO Members' SPS measures justi-
fied on health or environmental grounds be "based on scientific principles
and . . . not [be] maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."299
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement was also violated because the Member
State bans were not "based on an assessment.., appropriate to the cir-
cumstances." °° In response to these violations, the Panel recommended
that "[M] ember State safeguard measures [be brought] into conformity
with its obligations under the SPS Agreement."301
B. How Later EU GMO Regulations Address the Panel Report
The EC-Biotech panel began its proceedings before Regulations
1829/2003 and 1830/2003 took effect.3"2 The Panel, therefore, found their
terms and application irrelevant to the case. 3 The Regulations, how-
ever, instituted some changes in the EU's GMO regime that might be in
conformity with the Panel's report and recommendations.
The very existence of Regulations 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 indi-
cates that the EU reached some political consensus regarding its GMO
regime. The Group of Five countries, which effectively created the gen-
eral moratorium, cited several reasons why they intended to prevent the
entry of any new GMOs onto the EU market, namely the need for a
"more transparent framework, in particular for risk assessment, having
regard to the specifics of European ecosystems, monitoring and labelling,
[and] . . . the need to restore public and market confidence."30 4 The
297 Id. at 1072-73, 1078, 1084.
29 Id. at 1073-76.
9 SPS Agreement, supra note 291, at art. 2.2.300 Id. at art. 5.1.3 0 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 1076.
302 Id. at3.
" See id. at 354.304 Id. at 435.
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Regulations address these concerns by creating clearer rules on labeling
and risk assessment." 5 The Regulations also take significant steps to in-
crease public awareness of the process and information about GMOs in
the EU market."6 The implementation of the Regulations, therefore, sig-
naled an end to the general moratorium.
Second, Regulation 1829/2003 includes a set time frame for the
processing of applications for GMOs.3 °7 This time frame can be explained
by the political consensus, but there is also a point of legal significance.
As a Regulation, its terms have direct effect, meaning that individuals
can immediately enforce the terms of the Regulation in national courts.0 8
Therefore, importers filing an application can sue for injunctive relief to
have the Member State follow the mandated time line. This serves as a
safeguard against the undue delays experienced in the old GMO system
which violated the SPS Agreement.0 9
Third, the Regulations' emphases on scientific reasoning and con-
sistent labeling rules make it more difficult for Member States to reject
a GMO from entering the EU market and/or the Member State's territory.
Regulation 1829/2003 requires that the EFSA do a scientific analysis of
each GMO applying for access to the EU market. 31 The EFSA has the
power to act as the arbiter of scientific disputes about the GMOs.31" ' It is
very difficult for the Commission to go against EFSA's recommendations
about any GMO.312 Accordingly, the current GMO approval system places
a high premium on sound science. A Member State would have to present
very new, very compelling science in order to go against an EFSA recom-
mendation.3 3 Furthermore, Regulation 1830/2003's harmonized labeling
rules ensure that all GMOs are labeled in a consistent fashion through-
out the EU.31 4 This helps prevent a Member State from blocking a GMO
from entering its territory because the GMO might be labeled according
305 See Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at arts. 12-14, 24-26; Council
Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20, at art. 4.30 See supra Part II.B.3.
307 Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at arts. 5, 6, 10, 17, 18, & 22.
308 CRAIG & DE Bf-RCA, supra note 92, at 165.
3 1 See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
310 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
311 See Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20.
312 Case T-13/99, Pfizer vs. Council, 2002 E.C.R. 11-146 (holding that the Commission must
act within the scientific recommendations of the EFSA unless new or additional scientific
evidence and a corresponding justification are supplied).
313 Chalmers, supra note 18, at 653.
314 See Council Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20, at art. 4.
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to another Member State's labeling rules. 15 For these reasons, Regula-
tions 1829/2003 and 1830/2003 make it quite difficult for Member States
to find appropriate legal reasons to continue with their bans on individual
GMOs in violation of the SPS Agreement.316 As demonstrated, Regulations
1829/2003 and 1830/2003 take significant steps to bring the EU's GMO
regime into compliance with the WTO agreements.
C. Issues Affecting the GMO Regime Left Unresolved by the WTO
Panel Report
Though the EU has arguably brought its GMO regime into accor-
dance with the WTO agreements, several issues still stand in the way of
the successful importation of GMOs into the EU. If these issues are not
resolved, the WTO report and recommendations are for naught, because
other obstacles can prevent GMOs from getting to market. If the GMOs do
not get to market, then the EU or the Member States could have another
case brought against them at the WTO to challenge the provisions that
prevent the GMOs from reaching end consumers in the EU market. On
the other hand, if the EU and the Member States choose to uphold the
WTO decision to the utmost, many stakeholders within the EU and in
the international community could resist such action.
First, the WTO decision regarding the Member State bans presents
EU constitutional problems. Article 30 of the EU Treaties allows a Member
State to restrict the import and transit of goods within its territory if
"justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security."317
Such restrictions, however, cannot "constitute a means of arbitrary discrim-
ination or a disguised restriction on trade."1 8 In other words, as long as a
Member State has a principled, non-arbitraryjustification for its restric-
tion, the EU Treaties appear to allow it. Granted, Regulation 1829/2003
creates a complex GMO approval process designed to gather support for
each GMO with scientific, technical and political consensus." 9 Even under
such a process, though, the EU cannot prevent Member States from acting
under Article 30.320
31 5 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291!R, 870 (Sept. 29, 2006) (referring to the marketing bans).
316 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
317 EU Treaties, supra note 274, at art. 30.
318 Id.
319 See Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20.
32 0 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 870 n.1686 (Sept. 29, 2006) (noting that evidence in-
dicates that the Member States did not lift their bans even after called to do so by the
Commission).
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The WTO Panel, however, has held that the Member State bans
are inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 321 These
WTO provisions, though, only value assessments with a clear scientific
basis.322 Provisions under Article 30 need simply be justified on public
morality or policy grounds, and these justifications cannot be arbitrary.323
The Panel decision seems to limit the available justifications that a
Member State may use to restrict GMO trade to scientific justifications.
The Panel, however, only directed its report to the EU, not the individual
Member States.3 24 The EU cannot compel the Member States to construe
Article 30 as narrowly as the Panel would have it. If the Member States
are willing to suffer economic retaliation from the Complaining Parties,325
then compliance with the WTO obligations cannot be compelled.
Second, the WTO Panel explicitly did not resolve science based
questions regarding the safety of GMOs, whether GMOs are effectively
'like' their conventional counterparts, and whether the scientific bodies
in the EU correctly assess the safety of GMOs.326 With none of these ques-
tions resolved, questions about the environmental impact of GMOs re-
main open for consideration and policy response.3 2' Two environmental
concerns are of particular significance in the EU: superweeds and hybrid-
ization.32 Superweeds result from genetic modifications that create vari-
ants of plant species resistant to the threats that keep a conventional
plant's population in check, like natural predators and herbicides.329
321 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
322 SPS Agreement, supra note 291, at arts. 2.2, 5.1.
32' EU Treaties, supra note 274, at art. 30.31 SeeEC-Biotech, WT/DS291IR at 282 (in the findings section, the European Communities
is the party, not the individual member states); id at 1073-76 (addressing state specific
action as European Community violations).
325 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 28, at 86-92.
32 6EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 1067.
327 Les Levidow et al., Genetically Modified Crops in the European Union: Regulatory
Conflicts as Precautionary Opportunities, 3 J. OF RISK RES. 189, 191-92 (2000) (arguing
that the absence of scientific, technocratic decision making leaves the process of policy
creation in the GMO realm to political questions).
" Les Levidow et al., European Biotechnology Regulation: Framing the Risk Assessment
of a Herbicide-Tolerant Crop, 22 SCI., TECH., & HuM. VALUES 472,473-74 (1997) (noting that
a proposal to approve market access for an herbicide tolerant crops can result in the crea-
tion of ever more resistant weeds, inspired much policy debate); CLARE MILLER, MARIANNE
KETUNEN, & CLARE SHINE, SCOPE OPTION FOR EU ACTION ON INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES
(IAS) 41-47 (Institute for European Environmental Policy ed., 2006) (describing Member
State policy measures ensured to prevent invasive species from endangering biodiversity).
3 Anthony J. Conner et al., The Release of Genetically Modified Crops into the Environment:
Part IL Overview of Ecological Risk Assessment, 33 THE PLANT J. 19, 22-23 (2003).
1008 [Vol. 33:971
GENTLY MODIFIED OPERATIONS
Hybridization occurs when a genetically modified organism transfers some
of its adulterated genetic material into another species, resulting in the
replacement of the original species with the hybrid.33° The science behind
these fears inspires much debate and the GMO scientific community has
come to no clear consensus.33' The WTO Panel's decision, however, seems
to suggest that the science which finds that GMOs generally lead to envi-
ronmentally damaging superweeds and hybridization cannot be an ade-
quate basis for preventing GMOs from entering certain Member States.332
By not addressing the validity of the general science or its application
directly, the WTO has done nothing to prevent the EU and the Member
States from using it as the basis to justify other regulations of GMOs in
the EU. As long as such measures do not fit under the SPS Agreement,
such measures would not be in conflict with the Panel's determination.
Third, the Panel Report does not address the customs procedures
that Member States may use to prevent GMOs from entering the EU mar-
ket. Free to determine BTIs,333 Member State customs authorities can
put GMOs under customs classifications with increased duties or restric-
tions for entry onto the market.334 Also, each customs authority sets its
own customs warehousing rules. 335 Regulation 1829/2003 did not desig-
nate that approved GMOs be considered community goods intended for
free circulation.336 Each customs authority, therefore, may require further
safety testing of the GMO shipment at the point of entry.337 Such testing
may require that the GMO shipment be warehoused. Each Member State
may set rules for the manner and duration of customs warehousing as
well as the terms of release from the warehouse.338 The terms of release
330 Rosie S. Hails, Genetically Modified Plants-the Debate Continues, 15 TREE 14, 14
(2000).
" See id.
33 2EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 870 (noting that generalized concerns about the safety
of certain GMOs did not result in any specific GMO being given a safety assessment by
the EU scientific committees).
3 See supra notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., Taxation and Customs Union, TARIC Textual Search, http://ec.europa.eu/
taxationcustoms/dds/cgi-bin/tarquer?Lang=EN (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (searching for
"corn" results in fifteen broad classifications, each with multiple different duty rates and
regulations for entry).3 5 See Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20.
336Id.
" For example, Greece requires the laboratory testing of some agricultural shipments
to ensure that they are GMO free. STAMATIS SEKLIZIOTIS, GREECE CONTINUES TO BAN GM
CORN FOR PLANTING 2 (USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, Apr. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200704/146280913.pdf.
' Commission Regulation 2454/93, supra note 255, at art. 540.
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may include assurances that the GMOs will only be transported in a cer-
tain manner or in certain vehicles.339 Furthermore, the misapplication of
any of these rules can only give rise to appeals rights set by the Member
State of import.340 These appeals processes may be cumbersome and
lengthy.34' Each of these procedures may severely hinder the ability of
an approved GMO to get onto the market. The WTO panel's report and
recommendations only consider the GMO approval system.342 Therefore,
the EU and its Member States can still effectively restrict, if not prevent,
the importation of GMOs into the EU market.
As demonstrated, the WTO panel report is a tool that cannot ad-
dress all the issues involved in the EU's GMO importation regime. To try
and use it to force change would be a lengthy endeavor that might in-
volve many more WTO Panel reports.' Failure to allow the GMO imports
could give rise to costly trade countermeasures. A solution to the dilemma
must both address EU concerns about GMOs and still allow the market
to decide whether Europeans can or want to consume them. The following
section proposes solutions that could achieve both.
V. ENVIRONMENTALLY MINDED SOLUTIONS TO THE GMO DISPUTE
The EU's concern about GMOs is embodied in the precautionary
principle.34 In essence, European constituencies do not let GMOs enter
the EU market until they are proven completely safe. The WTO decision
in EC-Biotech, however, strongly urges the EU to let GMOs come onto
the EU market, irrespective of concerns rooted in the precautionary prin-
ciple.' The Panel decision did not challenge the validity of the precaution-
ary principle as a principle of environmental law.' Therefore, the EU and
39 See id. at arts. 471-95.
o See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.34 1Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities-
Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/8 (Jan. 14,2005) (arguing that the burdensome nature
of customs appeals procedures are detrimental to U.S. business) [hereinafter EC-Customs].342 EC-Biotech, WT/DS291/R at 1067.
' If the complaining parties deem the EU did too little to change to the EU's GMO
approval regime, further WTO action may take place. See also MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra
note 28, at 32-40, 86-95. The EU's customs system has already come under some degree
of WTO review. EC--Customs, WT/DS315/8.
3" See supra note 4.
34' The WTO Panel's interpretation of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement can be under-
stood to require specific scientific backing for a decision to ban a GMO, rather than just
a general concern because of unresolved science. See supra Part 1V.C.
3m EC-Biotech, WT/DS29IIR at 338-39.
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the Member States can design and implement measures in accordance
with the precautionary principle to address their concerns. The specific
concerns that have emerged fall generally into three broad categories:
the creation of superweeds," v the destruction of the native habitat,' and
moral concerns. 9 The proposed solutions try to address each of these
concerns while still allowing for GMOs to come onto the EU market.
A. Proposed Customs Procedures
The concerns about GMOs ultimately arise out of a lack of infor-
mation about their impact on the environment.350 Any policies designed
to address them should prioritize the collection and dispersion of infor-
mation about GMOs, while preventing any of the known harms they may
cause. In the EU's case, policies and procedures should take steps to pre-
vent the creation of superweeds and the loss of native natural habitats
in the Member State territories. Also, as much information about GMOs
as possible should be collected and presented to the public in order to in-
form and/or challenge impressions about the moral and cultural implica-
tions of GMOs. The customs regime presents a perfectly situated forum
to achieve both ends. Three policy proposals within the customs regime
are presented below. The proposals are explained separately, but the
cumulative effect of their implementation would only further a successful
resolution to the GMO dispute.
1. Create BTIs for Each New GMO
BTIs set a common customs classification for any good coming into
the EU. To date, the EU has issued no BTIs regarding GMOs.35' An im-
porter holding a BTI "must... prove that.., the goods declared corre-
spond in every respect to those described in the information."352 The BTI
can require that the GMO in question be properly labeled in accordance
See supra notes 311-16 and accompanying text.
348 Id.
349 See U.S.-EU BIOTECHNOLOGY CONSULTATIVE FORUM, THE U.S.-EU CONSULTATIVE FORUM
FINAL REPORT 5 (2000), available at httpJ/www.usembassy.itpdf/other/biotech.pdf.
See Levidow, supra note 328, at 189-90.
See Taxation and Customs Union, EBTI Database, Keywords, http://ec.europa.eu/
taxationcustoms/dds/cgi-binlebtiquer?Lang=EN (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (searching
under the word "gene").
352 Council Regulation 2913/92, supra note 25, at art. 12(3).
20091 1011
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
with Regulation 1830/2003, or be accompanied by safety certification sim-
ilar to that issued by EFSA during the GMO approval process.353 Failure
to provide either or both would mean that the GMO would not qualify for
the BTI. Qualifying under a BTI can expedite customs processing.
With clarity and speed as incentives, importers would be more will-
ing and diligent in following the labeling guidelines. Also, the importers
could take a more proactive interest in the safety of the GMO in order to
assure that it would continue to stay safe, and thus continue qualifying
for the BTI. Both the labels and the safety certification increase informa-
tion about the GMO for the EU, the Member States and end consumers.
2. Link Customs Laboratories to the Community Reference
Laboratory on GMOs
Regulation 1829/2003 established a Community reference lab-
oratory, in part, to collect information about best practices in methods
of sampling and detection.354 Customs officials initiate procedures that
affect entry onto the market, such as warehousing, based on sampling
and detection of GMOs trying to clear customs.355 Having Member State
customs laboratories report their findings to the Community reference
laboratory would help provide valuable information on these important
procedures in the GMO regime. The Community reference laboratory
could serve to help keep customs officials throughout the EU abreast of
the latest trends and discoveries in GMO detection and sampling. Ex-
change of such information would further the goals of the EU's customs
cooperation program, known as Customs 2007.6
The customs warehousing process also provides a unique testing
ground for the environmental impact of GMOs. As employees in areas
through which all GMO crops, seeds, feed, and food must pass, customs
scientific officials are in a unique position to report on the effects of the
presence of GMOs on the environment in and around customs facilities.
Reporting any findings of a GMO's weediness or other impact on the
environment could readily alert other customs officials to any potential
s Council Regulation 1830/2003, supra note 20, at art. 4.
Council Regulation 1829/2003, supra note 20, at 36.
, See supra note 338.
European Commission Taxation and Customs Union, What is Customs 2007?, http://ec
.europa.eu/taxation -customs/customs/coperatin-programmes/customs-2007/indexen
.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
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environmental dangers. Such information could help in the design of
better warehousing facilities and procedures to prevent environmental
damage. Analysis of warehoused GMOs may reveal that the longer the
GMO remains in one place, the more likely it is that it will impact the
surrounding environment. In short, customs can collect valuable infor-
mation about the environmental impact of GMOs and make it readily
available to other Member States.
3. Create Special GMO Transit Procedures
Each Member State has the ability to condition the release of goods
held in customs. 3 7 One such guarantee can be that GMOs be transported
in specialized vehicles along designated routes. By designating the man-
ner of transport, the risks associated with GMOs can be limited and con-
tained. Further, using these procedures increases information about the
impact of GMOs, because it will be possible to trace exactly where GMOs
might have entered the environment in the Member State's territory. Such
procedures can be deemed "GMO Transit Procedures."
The EU customs system already has significant common transit
procedures.35 Many of these procedures are agreed upon internationally.
For example, as a party to the International Plant Protection Convention,
the EU already employs certain plant protection and quarantine proce-
dures. 359 Based on the specific concerns of Member States, the EU, or the
Member States individually, can require transport of GMOs to include
more stringent security measures than covering trucks with tarps or
mowing roadside ditches.360 As with transportation under the TIR or ATA
carnet procedures, customs authorities throughout the EU can control
whether importers are following the GMO Transit Procedures. 361 This
way, each Member State, and even regions within Member States, can re-
flect how concerned they are with the environmental risks posed by GMOs
through the level of restrictions they place on the transit of GMOs.
... See EC-Customs, WT/DS315/8, at 2.
5 See Commission Regulation 2454/93, supra note 255, at arts. 309-495.
3 9 International Plant Protection Convention, International Phytosanitary Portal, httpsJ/
www.ippc.int/IPP/En/default.jsp (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
o See Redick, supra note 5, at 103 (listing measures that have been required by IPPC
Parties, including covering trucks and mowing road ditches).
"' Commission Regulation 2454/93, supra note 255, at art. 451-61.
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B. Assessment of the Viability of the Proposed Customs Procedures
The proposed solutions can not only help resolve issues surround-
ing the importation of GMOs, but also align with the legal and political
systems in the EU, and internationally. If these policies do in fact align
with EU and international interests, there could be less resistance to their
adoption. Adoption of these proposals would advance both trade in GMOs
and protection of the environment.
First, none of the proposed solutions interfere with the current
system on GMO labeling and risk assessment. As argued, Regulations
1829/2003 and 1830/2003 make the GMO approval system consistent with
the WTO's SPS Agreement. 62 Importers would not have to complete any
more applications or risk assessments. 63 Rather, they would be given an
added incentive for following the labeling regulations and keeping abreast
of the GMO's impact on the environment. Member States would still re-
tain all of their rights under the current GMO approval regime and the
customs regime. The proposals would simply draw a scientific link be-
tween customs authorities and the GMO community.
Second, the proposals make use of institutions and processes that
already exist within the EU." The committees on customs and food safety
would continue to monitor and adapt the customs and GMO regimes to
new needs and challenges. These proposals might simply give them an
opportunity to combine their expertise. The customs laboratories and the
GMO laboratories would continue in their research, but would be better
situated to learn from each other. The Commission and the Council would
continue to design and implement the EU-level GMO and customs regimes
under the current procedures. These proposals would simply be another
combination of science and politics, ingredients which both institutions
handle regularly.
Third, these proposals would help ease some of the EU constitu-
tional tension presented by the WTO decision.3 ' As argued, the Panel re-
port limits Member States in their ability to prevent GMOs from entering
their territories. These proposals allow the Member States to still make
use of their health, environmental, and public morality concerns, but to
use this reasoning to design policies and procedures that govern the
.62 See supra Part IV.B.
3 Id.
3
"See supra Parts II.B & III.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
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transport of GMOs within their territories. In this way, the question is
not whether the goods can come in, but rather how they must travel.
This still gives Member States a means of addressing their GMO-related
concerns, but not at the expense of violating the WTO agreements.
Fourth, these proposals help assure that GMOs actually make it
to market safely. Many EU consumers find the very presence of GMOs
dangerous, and offensive.366 Other consumers and buyers of GMOs may
not mind so much. By actually letting the GMOs be sold, the market can
reflect whether importers should even bother to attempt to sell GMOs to
Europeans. Until the market is free to make this determination, importers
may still find reason to bring the EU before the WTO. If, on the other
hand, EU consumers begin to buy GMOs, then the extensive monitoring
systems in place can collect a wealth of information to help assess the
true impacts of GMOs.
Fifth, these proposals are consistent with the international cus-
toms regime.6 7 The BTI proposal would make use of the internationally
recognized customs nomenclature. These proposals would help create
some clarity regarding the EU's customs regime, thereby erring on the
side of consistency with the WTO agreements. The proposed transit pro-
cedure would make use of other international agreements and procedures,
thereby lending them credibility and advancing international coopera-
tion on customs issues.
Sixth, the proposals are consistent with the international GMO
trade regime.368 These proposals facilitate compliance with the WTO
panel's recommendations. The proposals also create a vehicle for the suc-
cessful implementation of the precautionary principle embodied in the
Cartagena Protocol.3 69 As such, the proposals would be seen as evidence
that WTO Agreements and the Cartagena Protocol do not conflict.
CONCLUSION
The EC-Biotech case brought conflicting views on GMOs sharply
into light. The Complaining Parties and the WTO Panel ultimately called
on the EU to allow for the importation of GMOs into Europe. In the EU's
mind, though, successful importation of GMOs cannot come at the expense
See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.A.
369 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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of the environment. In fact, since 2003, EU imports of GMO maize and
corn products have steadily declined.7 0
The EU customs system could reinforce resistance against GMO
imports. Some new policies and approaches to GMO imports within the
EU's customs regime, though, can achieve the dual goals of both facilitat-
ing trade and protecting the environment. These proposals makes sense
legally and politically at the EU and international levels. No easy solu-
tions can or will emerge about GMOs and their international sale. Con-
sidering her size and leadership on the matter, Europe must continue to
develop policies that manage GMOs in an environmentally sound and
socially conscious manner.
370 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNAPPROVED GMOs ON EU FEED IMPORTS
AND LIVESTOCKPRODUCTION 3-4 (2007), available at http//www.salmone.org/wp-content/
uploads/2007/09/economicimpactgmos-en.pdf.
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